Directed-job match with hetereogeneity by Hori, Kenjiro
▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ 
ISSN 1745-8587 
 
 
School of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics 
 
 
 
 
BWPEF 0514 
 
 
Directed-Job Match with 
Heterogeneity 
 
 
Kenjiro Hori 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2007  
B
irk
be
ck
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
in
 E
co
no
m
ic
s 
&
 F
in
an
ce
 
Directed-Job Match with Heterogeneity∗
Kenjiro Hori
Birkbeck College, U.K.
August 8, 2007
Abstract
Matching process involves three stages of selection: application, candidates
selection and job acceptance. In traditional matching models all three stages are
assumed random, while in the directed-search literature only the first stage is
generally assumed ‘directed’. This paper develops a job-matching model where
all three selection stages are directed, by introducing heterogeneous preferences
of firms and workers. Both firm-level and aggregate matching functions are de-
rived, which in a comparison with random-matching models reveals that the
coordination failure problem is worse under heterogeneous directed-match when
the number of vacancies is small, but is better when it is large. Furthermore
directed-search limits friction when the market consists of fewer but larger firms.
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1 Introduction
In a job market the matching process involves three stages of selection: the applica-
tion stage, where workers select the firm(s) to apply to; the candidates selection stage,
where firms select the worker(s) to oﬀer jobs to; and the job acceptance stage, where
workers, if they have more than one job oﬀers, select one job to accept. Random-
matching models, such as Pissarides (1979), Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and
Julien et al. (2000), assume random selection in all three of the stages, which leads
to coordination failure resulting in frictional unemployment. The directed-search lit-
erature on the other hand assume that there is a criteria, such as the wage level or
the probability of a successful job match, upon which workers are attracted to certain
firms. However once firms and workers meet the selections there-onwards, i.e. those
in the latter two stages, are generally assumed random. There are at least two ques-
tions that can be raised with this set-up. One is that of symmetry in heterogeneity:
if workers are attracted to certain firms, firms should also be attracted to certain
workers. The second is that once job oﬀers are made, workers with a choice of job
oﬀers should also select the job to accept, using their original preference orderings
with which they chose the firms to make applications to. This paper attempts to
resolve these questions by developing a model of heterogeneous directed-search where
all three selection stages are directed. This is done by allowing workers and firms
to be heterogeneous, either in their skills-set possessed (by workers) or required (by
firms), and/or in other non-monetary job characteristics preferred or oﬀered, that
give rise to better matches between certain firms and workers. Workers then apply
to their most preferred jobs, while firms select their best matched candidates, after
which workers each accept their most preferred job. As Pissarides (2000) states a
matching function is “a modeling device that captures the implications of the costly
trading process without the need to make the heterogeneities and other features that
give rise to it explicit” (emphasis the author’s). The aim of this paper is to model
explicitly and comprehensively the heterogeneities.
The set-up here is that of workers and firms being represented by points on a
multi-dimensional heterogeneity domain, depending on their individual heterogeneity
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factors described above. The distances between the points represent the closeness of
their match, and the workers apply to a ≥ 1 ‘nearest’ jobs. The firms then select
the nearest candidates and make job oﬀers of the number which is the smaller of
the number of available vacancies and the number of received applications. For the
purpose of deriving the matching functions here the domain considered is a simple
one-dimensional circular domain (similar to Salop’s (1979) monopolistic competition
model). The workers who are situated around the circumference apply to a = 2
nearest firms, one on each side of them, and the firms compete for the workers in
between. The unknowns in the model are the number of workers choosing to apply
to any given two neighbouring firms (or in the measure where workers are uniformly
distributed, as assumed here, the distances between the firms), and the number of
vacancies oﬀered at each firm. If these variables were known, then firms and workers
would simply choose their optimal matches and there will be no coordination failure.
The number of successful hirings then depends on the relative size of the two unknown
variables, given the number of the firm’s own vacancies. Taking expectations over
these yields the firm-level matching function, which is found to be concave in the
number of own-vacancies. The aggregate matching function is derived by evaluating
the probability of a worker receiving at least one job oﬀer from the two firms that
he applies to, and multiplying it by the total number of applicants. This is found to
exhibit increasing returns with respect to the aggregate vacancies and unemployment
levels when the number of firms is assumed fixed.
A question that is raised then is whether coordination failure problem under het-
erogeneous directed-search is more or less severe than under random-matching. An
initial intuition may be that, as it allows better-matched workers and firms to attract
each other, directed-search may dominate random-matching in aggregate matching
success. However this is found not so: a comparison shows that while the heterogene-
ity model does outperform the random-matching model when the number of aggregate
vacancies is large, the order is reversed when the number is small. This is because the
heterogeneity eﬀect is more acute for smaller number of vacancies. Further it is also
shown that, given the aggregate number of vacancies, the coordination failure under
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heterogeneity is less severe when the job-matching market consists of fewer but larger
firms. This last result agrees with that attained by Burdett et al. (2001).1
Other models of directed-search in the literature include Moen (1997), Lagos
(2000) and Galenianos and Kircher (2005, 2007). In Moen (1997) the matching mar-
ket is divided into submarkets, each with exogenously assigned wage levels. The firms’
and workers’ choice of a submarket to join results from a trade-oﬀ between the wage
level and the matching rate within it. Once in a submarket the matching mechanism
is that of the traditional random-matching. Lagos (2000) derives a matching function
in a frame-work where homogeneous taxi drivers choose locations to meet the cus-
tomers, given a distribution of expected profit at each meeting points. Again there is
a trade-oﬀ between expected profit and the matching rate. Lagos calls the resulting
friction the ‘equilibrium friction’ and distinguishes it from the usual random matching
frictions, in that the agents ‘choose’ the equilibrium level of friction. In Galenianos
and Kircher (2005) the application process is modelled as an optimal portfolio selec-
tion problem, where the willingness of workers to apply to jobs with diﬀerent wages
(and hence diﬀerent job-match probabilities) incentivise homogeneous firms to post
diﬀerent wages. Finally in Galenianos and Kircher (2007) firms with heterogeneous
productivity post diﬀerent wages to attract homogeneous workers. In all these cases
even though in the application stage workers are attracted to diﬀerent firms for dif-
ferent reasons, selections in the candidates selection, and where appropriate in the
acceptance stages, are assumed random. As already stated in this paper even these
two latter stages depend on firms’ and workers’ heterogeneous preferences.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the heterogeneous
directed-search is introduced and both firm-level and aggregate matching functions are
derived. Section 3 compares this model with the existing random-matching models,
to suggest conditions under which coordination failure is more severe in one than the
other. Section 4 then gives concluding remarks.
1Their model consists of buyers each wanting to buy one unit, and sellers each oﬀering a deter-
ministic number of goods. Viewing the prices posted by diﬀerent sellers, the buyers choose a mixed
strategy of selecting sellers to approach. However once the buying interests are received the sellers
select the buyers randomly. Therefore in their model only the first selection stage is directed.
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2 From Random Matching to Heterogeneous Directed-
Search
2.1 Workers
In this model the heterogeneity of workers can be in their skills-set, and/or in their
preferences for job characteristics such as the nature of the job, work environment,
geographical location or friendliness of the colleagues. The only requirement is that
both workers and firms have heterogeneous preferences for their prospective firms
or workers. Workers then apply to their most preferred firms, and the firms choose
their best-matched workers. For example in the case that workers diﬀer in their
skills-set, where a better match leads to a higher productivity, if the wage levels are
determined by a Nash bargaining then workers and firms would select their most prof-
itable matches. Workers and firms can therefore be represented as diﬀerent points on
a multi-dimensional heterogeneity domain, with distances between them indicating
how close a match they are with each other. For the purpose of deriving the matching
function, I consider here a simple one-dimensional circular domain with circumfer-
ence Ω. This is similar to Salop’s (1979) model of monopolistic competition where
competitors are situated on a circular market, the idea which was later employed to
a clearing labour market by Hamilton et al. (2000).2 The measure is also chosen in
which workers are distributed uniformly around Ω, as depicted in Figure 1. Then if
the total number of workers searching for jobs in the job-matching market is u, the
distance between two neighbouring workers is Ωu . It is assumed that no two workers
are identical, i.e. each point on the circumference represents a single applicant.
2.2 Random Matching
First consider the case of random matching, where workers each apply to a ≥ 1 jobs.
The case of multiple-applications matching was first analysed by Albrecht, Gautier,
Tan and Vroman (2004) (hereafter AGTV), and was later refined by Hori (2007a).
2They assume continuously and uniformly distributed workers along a circular skills space, with
equally spaced firms.
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v jobs
u workers 
Figure 1: Random Matching
As with AGTV assume for now that each firm consists of one job vacancy, i.e. F = v
where F is the number of firms and v is the total number of vacancies in the job
market. In this paper’s set-up the v jobs can be thought of as being situated within
the circle, as shown in Figure 1, where the u workers on the circumference select a
jobs randomly. This is analogous to the urn-ball set-up were workers select a balls
out of an urn containing v balls. Firms receiving more than one applications then
randomly select one candidate and make a job oﬀer. Finally workers with more than
one job oﬀers selects one and accepts, and the match is complete. Working in the
limit that u, v →∞ but vu = θ ¿∞, the probability that the firm a workers applies
to receives α ≥ 0 other job applications is given by a Poisson distribution with rate
au
v =
a
θ , and therefore the probability of a job oﬀer by the firm, denoted by Ψ, is
3
Ψ =
u−1X
α=0
1
α+ 1
¡a
θ
¢α e−aθ
α!
=
θ
a
³
1− e−aθ
´
. (1)
As discussed in AGTV (2004) and Hori (2007a), in the limit u, v →∞ this probability
of a job oﬀer at each firm is independent from each other, and therefore the probability
that a worker receives at least one job oﬀer from the a applications is 1 − (1−Ψ)a.
Hence the expected number of matches M in a random-matching job market with
3For the case of finite u and v see AGTV (2004) or Hori (2007a).
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Figure 2: Multiple-Vacancies Firms (above) and Multiple-Applications Workers (be-
low) on a Circular Heterogeneity Domain
single-vacancy firms can be calculated by the following matching function,
m(u, v; a) = u
½
1−
∙
1− θ
a
³
1− e−aθ
´¸a¾
. (2)
2.3 Directed-Search
Next consider the case of directed-search. The firms are now also represented by points
on the heterogeneity circumference, (Figure 2 shows a segment of the circumference),
and the workers and jobs now match depending on their ‘closeness’ in the heterogene-
ity domain. In contrast to the random-matching model outlined above, it is now also
assumed that each job can advertise a multiple number of vacancies {v1, v2, ..., vF },
with v =
PF
i=1 vi. Distances between the firms are given by {x1, x2,...,xF}, withPF
i=1 xi = Ω. In this analysis I concentrate on the case a = 2, and hence the work-
ers apply to their nearest firm on either side of them on the circumference. Having
received those applications, firms in turn make the exact number of job oﬀers as the
number of their vacancies to their ‘nearest’ candidates. The workers who receive more
than one job oﬀers then accept their nearest job, and the match is complete. This
diﬀers from the set-ups in other models of directed-search in that, whilst in those
candidate selection by firms and job acceptance by workers are still assumed random,
here they are modelled explicitly as being directed, as discussed in the introduction
section of this paper. In this simple representation of a heterogeneous job-matching
market then a hiring firm has two rivals, one on each side along the circumference,
with whom it would compete for the workers situated between them. The workers in
turn would receive either zero, one or two job oﬀers.
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There are two sources of randomness in the model. One is the number of workers
who choose to apply to any two neighbouring firms. In the chosen measure with
uniformly distributed workers, this translates to random distances xi between the
firms. The number of firms in any given distances is assumed Poisson distributed with
rate FΩ . Then xi is the ‘arrival distance’ of the nearest firm, which is exponentially
distributed with support [0,Ω] and mean ΩF .
4 The probability density functions φxi
for the distances xi is then,
φxi =
F
Ω
e−
F
Ωxi , (3)
with
R Ω
0 φxidxi = 1 in the limit of large Ω. The other source of randomness is
the number of vacancies vi at each firm. The aggregate number of vacancies v is
deterministically known. In the limit v →∞, vi ∈ {0, 1, ..., v} can be assumed to be
independently distributed for all i = 1, ..., F with the following Poisson density with
rate vF ,
φvi =
¡ v
F
¢vi e− vF
vi!
. (4)
For example then there is a e−
v
F probability that the firm actually oﬀers no vacancy.
The incomplete information assumption leads to coordination failure in both stages
of application and candidate selection; if these variables were known, then firms and
workers will simply choose their optimal matches. Other aggregate numbers u and F
of applicants and firms are deterministically known.
Investigate first now the firm-level matching rate. This depends on the relative
size of the two sources of randomness above where, if the number of vacancies at the
rival firm is small relative to the distance then the success rate is high, while if it is
large then the firm will be less successful in filling its vacancies. Consider then a firm
i. Its nearest competitors are firms i − 1 and i + 1, at distances xi−1 and xi on its
left- and right-hand sides respectively. These distances are unknown to firm i. Firm
i knows the number of its own vacancies vi, but not those of its rivals vi−1 and vi+1.
The number of candidates available for firm i between it and the nearest rivals are
u
Ωxi−1 and
u
Ωxi respectively. Since the firm does not know its success rates on either
4See for example Ross (2003) Ch 5.3.3.
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side of it along the circumference, it makes vi2 oﬀers each to workers on its either
side. Here, and for the rest of the paper, the additional complication of the number
of vacancies being an odd number is ignored. Now denote by MiR the number of
vacancies filled for firm i on its right-hand side after a round of job matching. This
depends on the diﬀerent scenarios of the relative sizes of vi, vi+1 and xi, which I now
consider individually.
Firstly if the number of oﬀers on the right-hand side vi2 is less than half the
available workers 12
u
Ωxi, all
vi
2 workers will accept the oﬀer from firm i as firm i is the
nearest firm for these. If however vi2 is greater than
1
2
u
Ωxi, then firm i will now be
oﬀering jobs to some of the workers for whom firm i+ 1 is the nearest, and therefore
it may not get all its oﬀers accepted. This would certainly be the case if additionally
vi+1 ≥ vi, in which case both firms get 12
u
Ωxi workers each. If however
vi
2 is greater
than 12
u
Ωxi but vi+1 < vi, then there can be three further scenarios. First if the total
number of job oﬀers by the two firms vi2 +
vi+1
2 for the workers within xi is less than
the available workers uΩxi, then there will be no overlap between the two firms’ oﬀers,
and both will get their full quota of workers, i.e. MiR = vi2 . If however
vi
2 +
vi+1
2 is
greater than the available workers uΩxi, but
vi+1
2 is less than
1
2
u
Ωxi, then firm i will be
able to claim all the workers that are closer to firm i + 1 but do not get oﬀers from
the firm, i.e. uΩxi −
vi+1
2 . Finally if
vi+1
2 is also greater than
1
2
u
Ωxi both will simply
get their closest workers 12
u
Ωxi. In summary then,
MiR =
vi
2
if
vi
2
≤ 1
2
u
Ω
xi
=
1
2
u
Ω
xi if vi ≤ vi+1 and
vi
2
>
1
2
u
Ω
xi
=
vi
2
if vi > vi+1 and
vi
2
+
vi+1
2
≤ u
Ω
xi ≤ vi (5)
=
u
Ω
xi −
vi+1
2
if vi > vi+1 and vi+1 ≤
u
Ω
xi ≤
vi
2
+
vi+1
2
=
1
2
u
Ω
xi if vi > vi+1 and
u
Ω
xi ≤ vi+1.
Note that in theory one can envisage a situation where, if required, firm i may be
able to employ workers on the other side of firm i + 1 once firm i + 1 has filled its
vacancies. However for this to happen it would require a combination of relatively
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large vi, small xi, even smaller vi+1, large xi+1 and small vi+2, the joint probability
of which I consider to be too small to aﬀect the results obtained here.
Then,
Proposition 1 (Firm-Level Matching Function) The expected number of vacan-
cies filled Mi for firm i given vi, v, u and F is given by the following firm-level
matching function,
mi(vi, v, u, F ) =
u
F
³
1− e−Fu vi
´
+
u
F
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
³
e−
F
u
vi
2 − e−Fu
vi+1
2
´2
(6)
where φvi+1 is given by (4).
Proof. The expected number of filled jobs for firm i on its right-hand side is
calculated by taking the expectations of (5) over the two random variables xi and
vi+1 in the limit of large Ω,
MiR =
Z ∞
vi Ωu
vi
2
φxidxi +
vX
vi+1=vi
φvi+1
Z vi Ωu
0
uxi
2Ω
φxidxi +
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
"Z vi Ωu
 vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
vi
2
φxidxi
+
Z  vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
vi+1 Ωu
³uxi
Ω
− vi+1
2
´
φxidxi +
Z vi+1 Ωu
0
uxi
2Ω
φxidxi
#
, (7)
where φxi and φvi+1 are given respectively by (3) and (4). By symmetry the expected
number of vacancies filled on the firm’s left-hand side,MiL, is also given by (7). Hence
the total expected number of filled vacanciesMi is twice (7). By subtracting uxi2Ω from
the last three integrands and adding them to the second then,
Mi =
Z ∞
vi Ωu
viφxidxi +
Z vi Ωu
0
uxi
Ω
φxidxi +
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
"Z vi Ωu
 vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
³
vi −
uxi
Ω
´
φxidxi
+
Z  vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
vi+1 Ωu
³uxi
Ω
− vi+1
´
φxidxi
#
. (8)
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Now in substituting in φxi =
F
Ωe
−FΩxi , the first two terms in (8) are,
Z ∞
vi Ωu
viφxidxi = vie
−Fu vi ,
Z vi Ωu
0
uxi
Ω
φxidxi =
u
F
−
³
vi +
u
F
´
e−
F
u vi .
The second integration is evaluated by parts. These add up to,
First two terms of (8) =
u
F
³
1− e−Fu vi
´
.
Similarly evaluating the latter two terms within [.] in (8),
Z vi Ωu
 vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
³
vi −
uxi
Ω
´
φxidxi =
∙µ
vi − vi+1
2
¶
− u
F
¸
e−
F
u
 vi+vi+1
2

+
u
F
e−
F
u vi ,
Z  vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
vi+1 Ωu
³uxi
Ω
− vi+1
´
φxidxi =
∙
−
µ
vi − vi+1
2
¶
− u
F
¸
e−
F
u
 vi+vi+1
2

+
u
F
e−
F
u vi+1 .
These add up to,
Terms within [.] of (8) =
u
F
∙
e−
F
u vi − 2e−
F
u
 vi+vi+1
2

+ e−
F
u vi+1
¸
=
u
F
³
e−
F
u
vi
2 − e−Fu
vi+1
2
´2
.
Substituting these back into (8) yields (6).
The first term in (6) represents the cases of filling, on firm i’s either side, vi2 if
vi
2 <
uxj
2Ω , and
uxj
2Ω if otherwise, where j ∈ {i − 1, i}. These are the two possible
outcomes if firms i − 1, i and i + 1 were identical. The second term represents the
cases for filling on top of uxj2Ω , when
vi
2 >
uxj
2Ω , for example on its right-hand side extra
vi
2 −
uxi
2Ω if
vi+vi+1
2 <
uxi
Ω , and extra
uxi
2Ω −
vi+1
2 if
vi+vi+1
2 >
uxi
Ω but
vi+1
2 <
uxi
2Ω . These
outcomes occur in the asymmetric cases vi > vi−1 and vi > vi+1.
Now the firm-level matching function exhibits the following properties,
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Property 1 mi(vi, v, u, F ) has the following properties,
1. mi(0, v, u, F ) = mi(vi, v, 0, F ) = 0.
2. ∂mi∂u > 0 and limu→∞ mi = vi.
3. ∂mi∂vi > 0 and
u
F < limvi→∞
mi = uF
∙
1 + e−
v
F
µ
e
v
F e
−Fu − 1
¶¸
< 2uF .
4. ∂
2mi
∂v2i
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Properties 3 and 4 above imply a diminishing rate of success of filling vacancies on
the firm-level as the number of own-vacancies increases, with the number of successful
match bounded above. This property is demonstrated in the simulated graphs in
Figures 3 and 4. This is caused by the heterogeneity factor: as a firm widens its
net for potential candidates, the compatibility of workers on the periphery decreases,
reducing the firm’s chance of success in hiring the extra workers.
Now there are two ways of calculating the total expected number of filled vacancies
M for the economy. One is to average the number of firm-level matches in (6) over
all possible values of vi, and then multiplying it by the number of hiring firms F ,
m(u, v, F ) = F
vX
vi=1
φvimi(vi, v, u, F ) (9)
where φvi is again given by (4). The other way is,
Proposition 2 (Aggregate Matching Function) The total expected number of
filled vacancies M = m(u, v, F ) for the job-matching market (u, v, F ) is,
m(u, v, F ) = u
"
1− e
−2vF

1−e−
F
2u
#
. (10)
Proof. An applicant will be matched to a job for certain if he receives one or
more job oﬀers. Let the probability that an applicant receives a job oﬀer from a firm
12
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Figure 3: mi(vi, v, u, F ) vs u: vi = 25, v = 1000, F = 100; limU→∞Mi = 25
mi(vi,v,u,F)
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vi
Figure 4: mi(vi, v, u, F ) vs vi: u = 1000, v = 1000, F = 100; limvi→∞Mi = 13.86
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that he applies to be Ψ. Then in the set-up here where each applicant applies to the
two nearest firms, the probability that he has at least one job oﬀer is given by,
Probability of at least one job oﬀer = 1− (1−Ψ)2 . (11)
The aggregate number of matches is then this multiplied by u. Now for the nearest
firm i on his right-hand side, an applicant will receive a job oﬀer if the number of
vacancies vi, oﬀered by i to workers on its left-hand side, is greater than the number
of applicants nearer to the firm than him, i.e. vi2 ≥
u
Ωxi, where xi is the distance to
the firm. Hence the probability of a job oﬀer from firm i is,
Ψi =
Z Ω
0
vX
vi=1
φviχvi2 ≥ uΩxiφxidxi, (12)
where φvi and φxi are given by (4) and (3) respectively,
5 and χ vi
2
≥ uΩxi
is an indicator
function which takes the value 1 if vi2 ≥
u
Ωxi, and 0 if otherwise. Evaluating this,
Ψi =
vX
vi=1
φvi
Z viΩ
2u
0
F
Ω
e−
F
Ωxidxi
=
vX
vi=1
¡ v
F
¢vi e− vF
vi!
³
1− e−
viF
2u
´
=
vX
vi=1
¡ v
F
¢vi e− vF
vi!
− e
− vF

1−e−
F
2u

vX
v=1
³
v
F e
− F
2u
´vi
e−
v
F e
− F2u
vi!
=
³
1− e− vF
´
− e
− vF

1−e−
F
2u
µ
1− e− vF e
− F2u
¶
= 1− e
− vF

1−e−
F
2u

. (13)
The fourth equality uses the fact that
Pv
vi=0
λvie−λ
vi!
= 1 for λ = vF or
v
F e
− F
2u . Replac-
ing Ψ in (11) with this Ψi and multiplying by u yields (10).
Note that if the indicator function in (12) was replaced by 1, i.e. the worker is the
5Note in particular that the distribution of the distance to the nearest firm is the same whether
your starting point is a firm or an applicant.
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preferred candidate by the applied firm with certainty, then the probability of a job
oﬀer (13) would equal 1 − e− vF . This is the probability that the best matched firm
has a strictly positive number of vacancies, when the number of vacancies is given
by a Poisson distribution with rate vF . On top of this (13) includes an adjustment
factor 1 − e− F2u , which is the probability that at least one firm chooses the worker’s
application as its most preferred application out of a total of 2u applications in the
market.
The aggregate matching function exhibits the following properties,
Property 2 M = m(u, v, F ) has the following properties,
1. m (0, v, F ) = m (u, 0, 0) = 0.
2. lim
u→∞
m(u, v, F ) = v for given v and F .
3. lim
v→∞
m(u, v, F ) = u for given u and F .
4. m(u, v, F ) exhibits constant returns to scale in (u, v, F ), and increasing returns
to scale in (u, v) for given F .
Proof. Trivial using (10).
An example of a graph of m(u, v;F ) is shown in Figure 5. One unresolved issue
in the matching function literature is the homogeneity of the aggregate matching
function. As noted by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), “testing for homogeneity,
or constant returns to scale, has been one of the preoccupations of the empirical
literature.” The conclusion from their extensive survey is that the “stylized fact that
emerges from the empirical literature is that there is a stable aggregate matching
function of a few variables that satisfies the Cobb-Douglas restrictions with constant
returns to scale in vacancies and unemployment.” For example Pissarides (1986) in
using UK men’s data from 1967-83, estimates the elasticities of u and v to be 0.7
and 0.3 respectively. However there are also more recent studies that show evidence
of increasing returns, such as Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Warren (1996), and
15
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Figure 5: m(u, v, F ) vs u and v: F = 100
Münich et al. (1999).6 Theoretical studies are also divided in this issue. Whilst
Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and Julien et al. (2000) (see eqns (15) and (16)
below) suggest unit homogeneity in u and v, other derived functions such as Coles
and Smith (1998) suggest increasing returns.7 The derived matching function here
supports both claims: if an increase in the size of the labour market involves also a
proportional increase in the number of advertising firms (i.e. the average number of
vacancies per firm is stable) then the aggregate number of matches is homogeneous of
degree 1, while if the number of firms is relatively stable then the successful matching
rates Mv and
M
u will increase as the market size increases.
6The data sets used are as follows: Blanchard and Diamond (1990) the US data, 1968-81; Warren
(1996) the US manufacturing data, 1969-73; and Münich et al. (1999) the Czech Republic and
Slovakia data, 1991-96. Then for example Warren estimates the sum of the elasticities to be 1.33.
7Coles and Smith follow the ‘stock-flow’ approach where there are stocks U and V of unemployed
workers and vacancies who attempt to match with new flows of unemployed and vacancies u and v.
When there is a probability α of the match being unsuccessful, then the derived matching function is
M = v

1− αU

+ u

1− αV

Gregg and Petrongolo (1997) however claim that the increasing returns can be ruled out when extra
congestion externalities are considered between the newly unemployed.
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3 Is Directed-Match Better Than Random-Match?
As noted by AGTV (2004), under the condition u, v → ∞ where probabilities Ψ of
a job oﬀer from firms can be considered as being independent, the general aggregate
matching function when workers make a ≥ 1 applications is given by,
m(u, v; a) = u {1− (1−Ψ)a} . (14)
For random matching with single-vacancy firms, Ψ was given in (1). This function
incorporates the two sources of coordination failure as pointed out by Albrecht et al.
(2006): the urn-ball friction, where some firms receive more job applications than
their number of advertised vacancies while others less, and the multiple-applications
friction, where analogously some applicants receive more than one job oﬀers while
others none. For example letting a = 1 yields the matching function when workers
each make a single application that captures solely the urn-ball friction,
m(u, v; 1) = uΨ = v(1− e−uv ). (15)
This is the function derived by, amongst others, Blanchard and Diamond (1994)8 in
an urn-ball set-up that models solely the first selection (i.e. application) stage of the
matching process.9 On the other hand if a = v,
m(u, v; v) = u
½
1−
∙
1− 1
u
³
1− e− 1u
´¸v¾
≈ u
∙
1−
µ
1− 1
u
¶v¸
for large u, (16)
which is the function derived by Julien et al. (2000), in whose model the matching
trade is an auctioning process where firms compete for agents who have reservation
8Blanchard and Diamond’s derived matching function is in fact m = v

1− e− buv

, where b is the
exogenous probability of making an acceptable application, which “reflects the intensity of search by
workers and firms, as well as the skill and geographical distributions of workers and jobs” (Blanchard
and Diamond).
9The second and third (i.e. candidates selection and acceptance) stages, are made deterministic
by the assumption of single-application workers.
17
wages. By cutting out the application stage, this set-up solely captures the multiple-
applications friction in the candidates selection stage of job-matching.
In this paper’s model of heterogeneous directed-match, the probability of a job
oﬀer by a firm applied to was given in (13). Substituting this into (14) for a = 2
yields the derived matching function (10). While under heterogeneous directed-search
better-matched workers and firms do attract each other, it is still prone to both of the
frictions above in that it does not prevent more or less workers being attracted to a
firm than its number of vacancies, nor does it stop some workers receiving a multiple
number of job oﬀers while others none, under the incomplete information structure
assumed here. The question is whether it aggravates or alleviates these sources of
coordination failure in comparison to random-match. To investigate this compare the
two aggregate matching functions (2) and (10) when a = 2. Strictly speaking the
two results diﬀer in that the former assumes firms each with a single vacancy, while
the latter assumes multiple-vacancies firms. However a comparison would still be a
worthwhile exercise for an intuitive result which turns out to be quite intriguing. For
example random-matching produces more matches than directed-search when,
(2) > (10)⇔ 2u
"
1− e
− vF

1−e−
F
2u
#
< v
³
1− e−2uv
´
. (17)
But for F < 2u, e−
F
2u > 1− F2u and hence for the left-hand expression,
2u
"
1− e
− vF

1−e−
F
2u
#
< 2u
³
1− e− v2u
´
.
Therefore the suﬃcient condition that (17) holds is,
2u
³
1− e− v2u
´
< v
³
1− e− 2uv
´
⇔ v < 2u. (18)
Hence the random-matching assumption (albeit for single-vacancy firms) produces
unambiguously larger match than the heterogeneous directed-search when the number
of advertised vacancies is less than the total number of applications, irrespective of
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Figure 6: Random-Matching vs Heterogeneous Directed-Search: u = 100, F = 10
the number of firms F . On the other hand the directed-search produces a better
result when v becomes large for given u and F , although in the limit that v →∞ the
aggregate number of matches under both methods approach u. This is demonstrated
in Figure 6. Further, for given v, an increase in F reduces the matching success in
the directed-search as,
∂m(u, v, F )
∂F
= −2uv
F 2
∙
1−
µ
1 +
F
2u
¶
e−
F
2u
¸
e
− 2vF

1−e−
F
2u

< 0. (19)
This is strictly negative as 1 + F2u < e
F
2u for F < 2u and hence the term in [] is
strictly positive. This implies that the coordination failure problem is alleviated in
the heterogeneous directed-search when the labour market consists of a fewer firms but
with larger number of advertised vacancies, a result that agrees with the one attained
by Burdett et al. (2001).10 This result was in fact already indirectly stated when it
was shown that the aggregate matching function (6) exhibits increasing returns when
F is held fixed.
10 In a set-up already described in footnote 1, they conclude that “the frictions are more problematic
when there are more locations with limited capacity.”
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4 Conclusion
In this paper a new model of directed-search was developed by introducing hetero-
geneous preferences of firms and workers, which aﬀected not only the application
stage of matching, but also the candidates selection and the acceptance stages. In
this respect the model has a flavour of Cole and Smith (1998) in which friction is
also entirely caused by heterogeneity, where buyers and sellers fail to match due to
mismatch in the characteristics of the goods sought / oﬀered. However in their model
all agents have complete information, and hence there is no coordination problem.
Here incomplete information leads to coordination failure, but in a heterogeneous
directed-search framework rather than that of random-matching. In this new frame-
work both the firm-level and the aggregate matching functions were here derived,
and the performances of the heterogeneous search and the random-matching models
were compared. Finally it was predicted that the friction eﬀect is smaller in a market
where there are fewer but larger firms.
There are many possible extensions to this model, not least of it being an extension
to a n > 1 dimensional heterogeneity domain allowing a > 2 applications per worker.
However the more interesting cases would be the relaxations of the two elements
of randomness that still remain in the model. One is the number of workers who
choose to apply to each pair of neighbouring firms. For example one may consider a
model that incorporates workers’ and firms’ decision processes for their preferences of
counterparts that reflect heterogeneous skills match between them. This would lead
to a formal discussion about microeconomic wage-determination processes in a job-
matching market. Adding in further other non-monetary characteristics preferred
/ oﬀered by workers and firms may lead to interesting predictions about market
frictions or wage dispersion. A related work is given in Hori (2007b) where the optimal
application strategy is derived for workers with a preference for higher wages (i.e.
higher productivity skills match), who also have heterogeneous job oﬀer probabilities
at each firm. The other remaining random element is the number of vacancies oﬀered
by firms. A relaxation of this would require a formal modelling of the firms’ labour
demand. This may depend on the decreasing returns nature of the firm-level match
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demonstrated in this paper, as well as factors aﬀecting firms’ production, such as
product market demand, technology, or even the availability of appropriately skilled
workers. This potential extension would push the randomness assumed in the model
down to the levels of workers’ innate skills, technology shocks and product market
demand fluctuations. This will be a step towards developing a microeconomic theory
of unemployment, for which this paper provides a useful framework.
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A Proof of Property 1
1. Trivial using (6).
2. This is easiest seen by partially diﬀerentiating (8) by u. The derivative terms
corresponding to the terms in the limits cancel out, leaving,
∂mi
∂u
=
Z vi Ωu
0
xi
Ω
φxidxi
+
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
"
−
Z vi Ωu
 vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
xi
Ω
φxidxi +
Z  vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
vi+1 Ωu
xi
Ω
φxidxi
#
.
This is positive as
Z vi Ωu
0
xi
Ω
φxidxi =
vX
vi+1=0
φvi+1
Z vi Ωu
0
xi
Ω
φxidxi >
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
Z vi Ωu
 vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
xi
Ω
φxidxi.
For the limit u→∞, letting e−Fu vi ≈ 1− Fu vi in (6) yields limu→∞ mi = vi.
3. In partially diﬀerentiating (8) by vi once again the terms corresponding to the
limits cancel out, yielding
∂mi
∂vi
=
Z ∞
vi Ωu
φxidxi +
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
Z vi Ωu
 vi+vi+1
2

Ω
u
φxidxi > 0. (20)
For the limit let vi →∞ in (6),
lim
vi→∞
mi =
u
F
+
u
F
∞X
vi+1=1
¡ v
F
¢vi+1 e− vF
vi+1!
e−
F
u vi+1
=
u
F
⎡
⎢⎣1 + e−
v
u

1−e−Fu
 ∞X
vi+1=1
³
v
F e
−Fu
´vi+1
e−
v
F e
−Fu
vi+1!
⎤
⎥⎦
=
u
F
∙
1 + e−
v
u

1−e−Fu
µ
1− e− vF e
−Fu
¶¸
=
u
F
∙
1 + e−
v
u
µ
e
v
F e
−Fu − 1
¶¸
.
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This is greater than uF and smaller than
2u
F .
4. Diﬀerentiate (20) once again by vi,
∂2mi
∂v2i
= −F
u
e−
F
u vi +
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
∙
F
u
e−
F
u vi − F
2u
e−
F
u
 vi+vi+1
2
¸
= −F
u
e−
F
u vi
⎛
⎝1−
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1
⎞
⎠− F
2u
vi−1X
vi+1=1
φvi+1e
−Fu
 vi+vi+1
2

.
which is negative unambiguously.¥
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